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A critical problem in daily decision making is how to choose actions now in order to bring about rewards 
later. Indeed, many of our actions have long-term consequences, and it is important to not be myopic 
in balancing the pros and cons of different options, but rather to take into account both immediate and 
delayed consequences of actions. Failures to do so may be manifest as persistent, maladaptive decision-
making, one example of which is addiction where behavior seems to be driven by the immediate positive 
experiences with drugs, despite the delayed adverse consequences. A recent study by Takahashi et al. 
(2007) investigated the effects of cocaine sensitization on decision making in rats and showed that drug 
use resulted in altered representations in the ventral striatum and the dorsolateral striatum, areas that have 
been implicated in the neural instantiation of a computational solution to optimal long-term actions selection 
called the Actor/Critic framework. In this Focus article we discuss their results and offer a computational 
interpretation in terms of drug-induced impairments in the Critic. We ﬁ   rst survey the different lines of 
evidence linking the subparts of the striatum to the Actor/Critic framework, and then suggest two possible 
scenarios of breakdown that are suggested by Takahashi et al.’s (2007) data. As both are compatible with 
the current data, we discuss their different predictions and how these could be empirically tested in order 
to further elucidate (and hopefully inch towards curing) the neural basis of drug addiction.
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is not clear, of the many actions taken throughout 
the game, which were the critical ones that should 
be learned for future games. Similar problems are 
encountered to a greater or lesser extent through-
out our daily lives, in the many situations in which 
feedback for actions is not immediately available. 
Failure to solve this so-called “credit assignment” 
problem (Barto et  al., 1983; Sutton and Barto, 
1998) may be manifest as persistent, maladaptive 
decision-making: rather than being inﬂ  uenced by 
long-term goals, actions will be driven predomi-
nantly by proximal outcomes, thereby appearing 
INTRODUCTION
A critical problem in animal and human deci-
sion making is how to choose behavior that will 
in the long run lead to reward. For instance, when 
playing a game of chess, early moves may be cru-
cial to the long-term goal of winning: One set of 
moves may set the stage for a stunning victory; 
another result in a precipitous defeat. The difﬁ  -
culty in learning to play chess stems from the fact 
that the outcome, i.e., the win or loss at the end 
of the game, may be delayed with respect to such 
early actions. Moreover, once the game is over it Frontiers in Neuroscience  July  2008 | Volume  2 | Issue  1 | 87
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impulsive and “irrational”, and succumbing easily 
to the temptations of short term pleasures. One 
possible example of this is addiction, where behav-
ior seems to be driven by the early and immediate 
positive experiences with drugs, despite the often 
remote or delayed adverse consequences of con-
tinued drug use.
Although they do not play chess, rats encoun-
ter similar credit assignment problems in tasks 
that require multiple actions in order to obtain 
rewards or avoid punishments (e.g., when navigat-
ing a maze to a goal location or making a series of 
lever pressing and food-magazine approach actions 
in an operant chamber). Interestingly, exposure 
to addictive drugs has been shown to cause mala-
daptive decision-making in rats performing such 
tasks (Bechara and Damasio, 2002; Calu et  al., 
2007; Jentsch et  al., 2002; Nelson and Killcross, 
2006; Schoenbaum and Setlow, 2005; Schoenbaum 
et al., 2004; Simon et al., 2007; Vanderschuren and 
Everitt, 2004). In a study recently published in 
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience by Takahashi 
et al. (2007), these effects were linked to long-term 
changes in associative representations in two sub-
divisions of the striatum, the ventral striatum and 
the dorsolateral striatum. These areas have previ-
ously been implicated in the neural instantiation of 
a computational solution to the credit assignment 
problem, called the Actor/Critic learning and deci-
sion-making architecture.
In this Focus article, we discuss their results 
and offer a computational interpretation in terms 
of drug-induced modiﬁ  cations of the Actor/Critic 
model. We begin by describing the Actor/Critic 
framework, and presenting a short survey of the 
different lines of evidence linking it to the ventral 
and dorsolateral striatum and their dopaminergic 
afferents. We then explore the possible implications 
of the results reported by Takahashi et al. (2007) for 
such a model, by describing two possible scenarios 
in which the Actor must behave in the absence of 
a functional Critic. We conclude with directions 
of future research, which this study immediately 
suggests.
THE ACTOR/CRITIC MODEL: 
A PLAYER AND A COACH
One way to alleviate the credit assignment prob-
lem is by using as the advice of a coach: whether in 
sports or in chess, a coach who can give immedi-
ate feedback to actions even before the game has 
ended, can make all the difference in terms of learn-
ing. What the player really needs is someone that 
can tell her whether her current action is good or 
bad. Importantly, for this information to be   useful, 
it should evaluate the action with respect to the 
long-term goal of winning: a coach that reinforces a 
locally good action of capturing a pawn, despite the 
fact that a more strategic action had to be forfeited 
for this capture to happen, is rather dispensable.
The Actor/Critic architecture (Figure 1A) does 
exactly this: the Actor chooses actions according 
to some policy of behavior, and the Critic offers 
immediate feedback that tells the Actor whether 
the action selected was good or bad form the point 
of view of obtaining rewards in the long run (Barto 
et al., 1983). The crux of this model is a simple 
learning rule based on a Temporal Difference (TD) 
prediction error ( Barto et  al., 1989; Sutton, 1988; 
Sutton and Barto, 1990):
δt = r(St) + V(St) − V(St−1),
by which the Critic learns what feedback to give 
to each action, and the Actor learns an improved 
action selection policy. The components of this 
prediction error will be deﬁ  ned below.
In order to compute such a feedback prediction 
error, the Critic must ﬁ  rst evaluate the present state 
of the world (St – the current situation, comprised 
of the available stimuli and context) in terms of 
the long-term expected sum of future rewards 
when commencing behavior from this state. That 
is, the Critic can be seen as having two roles1: one 
is to assign a value V(St) to the current state, and 
the other is to combine state values with obtained 
rewards and compute the prediction error above. 
As we shall show below, these two roles are inti-
mately intertwined.
In this reinforcement learning framework, 
state evaluations are essentially an estimation 
of the sum of future rewards from this point 
onward. As a result, they should obey a simple 
local consistency relation: the reward expected 
from this time point onward should be equal 
to the immediate reward at the next time point 
plus any rewards expected from that time point 
onward, that is V(St−1) = r(St) + V(St) where r(St) 
denotes the (possibly stochastic or 0) immedi-
ate reward at state St. This consistency forms the 
basis for the TD prediction error: δt above quan-
tifies the inconsistency between successive values, 
i.e., the difference between reward predictions in 
consecutive states.
To learn correct values, all the Critic needs to do 
is to compute errors in its own value predictions 
1Some texts include only the value learning component in 
the Critic, with the prediction error computation external 
to both Actor and Critic. We have chosen here to include the 
prediction error within the Critic for the sake of consistency 
of the terminology: as will become clear in the following text, 
it is the prediction error that criticizes the Actor, not the state 
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and update its predictions such as to minimize 
these errors:
V(St−1)new = V(St−1)old + ηδt
where η is a learning rate (0 < η < 1; for a more 
detailed discussion of TD learning, see Barto, 1995; 
Niv and Schoenbaum, 2008). The elegance of this 
learning scheme is that local information (immedi-
ate rewards and stored estimations of values of the 
current and immediately preceding states) can be 
used to incrementally learn correct long-run value 
predictions.
Armed with long-run predictive values, the Critic 
can now coach the Actor. In fact, it turns out that the 
Actor can also learn from the same prediction error 
that the Critic computes in order to train its own val-
ues. This is because all that the Actor needs to know 
after every action, is whether this action improved 
its prospects for reward in the future, or not, that 
is, whether r(St) + V(St) > V(St−1), i.e., the prediction 
error δt is positive, or r(St) + V(St) < V(St−1) and the 
prediction error δt is negative, respectively. Actions 
that result in an increase in expected rewards should 
be repeated more often when in a similar situation, 
and vice versa for those which result in a decreased 
expectation of reward. Thus the same learning rule 
can be used to update the Actor’s action propensi-
ties π(a|St):
π(a|St−1)new = π(a|St−1)old + ηδt
where π(a|St−1) is the propensity to perform action 
a when in state St−1.
To recap, in the Actor/Critic architecture the 
Critic stores and learns state values and uses these 
to compute prediction errors, by which it updates 
its own state values. These same prediction errors 
are also conveyed to the Actor who stores and 
learns an action selection policy. The Actor uses the 
Critic’s prediction error as a surrogate reinforce-
ment signal with which it can improve its policy. In 
this particular division of labor, the “environment” 
sees only the output of the Actor, (i.e., the actions), 
however, rewards from the environment are only of 
interest to the Critic.
Figure 1 | The basic Actor/Critic architecture and its suggested neural implementation. (A) The (external or internal) environ-
ment provides two signals to the system: S, indicating the current state or stimuli, and r indicating the current reward. The Actor 
comprises of a mapping between states S and action propensities π(a|S) (through modiﬁ  able weights or associative strengths). 
Its ultimate output is an action which then feeds back into the environment and serves to (possibly) earn rewards and change the 
state of the environment. The Critic comprises of a mapping between states S and values V (also through modiﬁ  able weights). 
The value of the current state provides input to a temporal difference (TD) module that integrates the value of the current state, 
the value of the previous state (indicated by the feedback arrow) and the current reward, to compute a prediction error signal 
δt = r(St) + V(St) − V(St−1). This signal is used to modify the mappings in both the Actor and the Critic. (B) A suggested mapping of 
the Actor/Critic architecture onto neural substrates in the cortex and basal ganglia. The mapping between states and actions in the 
Actor is realized through plastic synapses between the cortex and the dorsolateral striatum. The mapping between states and their 
values is realized though similarly modiﬁ  able synaptic strengths in cortical projections to the ventral striatum. The prediction error 
is computed in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) – the two midbrain dopaminergic 
nuclei – based on state values from ventral striatal afferents, and outcome information from sources such as the pedunculopontine 
nucleus (PPTN), the habenula etc. (Christoph et al., 1986; Ji and Shepard, 2007; Kobayashi and Okada, 2007; Matsumoto and 
Hikosaka, 2007). Nigrostriatal and mesolimbic dopaminergic projections to the dorsolateral and ventral striatum, respectively, are 
used to modulate synaptic plasticity according to temporal difference learning.
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ACTOR/CRITIC IN THE BRAIN: 
THE BASAL GANGLIA
The Actor/Critic architecture is by no means the 
only solution to the credit assignment problem – it is 
certainly not the most efﬁ  cient solution or compu-
tationally sound option (see Sutton and Barto, 1998 
for a variety of other reinforcement learning algo-
rithms). However, converging behavioral, anatomi-
cal and physiological evidence links the Actor/Critic 
architecture to habitual behavior of animals and 
humans, and to action selection mechanisms in the 
basal ganglia (Barto, 1995; Houk et al., 1995; Joel 
et al., 2002).
The main neural structures implicated in associ-
ative learning and action selection are the basal gan-
glia (in particular the striatum), limbic subcortical 
structures (the amygdala and the hippocampus), 
and prefrontal cortical areas. Generally speaking, 
these can be viewed as the decision-  making inter-
face between sensory (input) and motor (output) 
areas of the brain. The striatum, which is the input 
structure of the basal ganglia, receives convergent 
topographically organized inputs from motor, sen-
sory, and limbic prefrontal cortical areas, as well 
as from the basolateral nuclei of the amygdala, the 
hippocampus, and the sensory thalamus. The basal 
ganglia then provide a positive feedback loop to 
the frontal cortex through cortico-striatal-pallido-
 thalamo-cortical loops (Albin et al., 1989; Alexander 
et  al., 1986; Joel and Weiner, 1994; Parent and 
Hazrati, 1993). Thus the striatum is well positioned 
to identify meaningful associations between cues, 
responses and outcomes and to use this informa-
tion to inﬂ  uence planning and action selection in 
the cortex (Joel and Weiner, 1999). Dopaminergic 
projections to the striatum are thought to play a 
critical role in this process by signaling reward pre-
diction errors (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 
1997) and modulating plasticity in cortico-striatal 
synapses (Wickens, 1990; Wickens et al., 2003).
Early mappings of the Actor/Critic model onto 
the basal ganglia identiﬁ  ed the value-  learning part 
of the Critic and the policy learning Actor with the 
“patch” (or striosome) and “matrix” (or matrisome) 
subpopulations of striatal medium spiny neurons, 
respectively (Brown et  al., 1999; Contreras-Vidal 
and Schultz, 1999; Houk et al., 1995; Suri, 2002; Suri 
and Schultz, 1999; Suri et al., 2001), and the predic-
tion error signal as carried by dopaminergic projec-
tions to the striatum (e.g., Barto, 1995; Houk et al., 
1995). The plausibility of the patch/matrix map-
ping was later challenged on anatomical grounds 
(Joel et  al., 2002), speciﬁ  cally in relation to how 
values in the Critic could affect the computation of 
a prediction error in dopaminergic nuclei, which 
is then conveyed to both Critic and Actor. Instead, 
current ﬁ  ndings suggest a   mapping in which the 
ventral subdivision of the striatum (including the 
nucleus accumbens) embodies the value learning 
part of the Critic that inﬂ  uences  dopaminergic 
prediction errors, and the dorsal striatum is the 
Actor (Joel et al., 2002; but see Atallah et al., 2007 
for a slightly different suggestion). While much 
evidence supports this suggestion, still more recent 
data advocate a reﬁ  nement of the Actor to include 
only the dorsolateral striatum (with the dorso-
medial striatum implicated in a different form of 
goal-directed action selection that cannot be sup-
ported computationally by an Actor/Critic archi-
tecture;  Balleine, 2005; Yin et  al., 2005). In the 
following we will brieﬂ  y review the evidence sup-
porting this ventral–dorsolateral striatal mapping 
of the Actor/Critic model, depicted with more 
detail in Figure 1B.
Recent work on the striatum has emphasized 
its division into different substructures based on 
connectivity patterns and functional roles (see 
Figure 2). The primary division is into dorsal and 
ventral parts (or dorsolateral and ventromedial; 
Voorn et al., 2004). The dorsal striatum is further 
comprised of two subparts: the caudate nucleus (or 
its homologue in rats, the dorsomedial striatum) 
and the putamen nucleus (or the dorsolateral stria-
tum in rats). Similarly, within the ventral striatum 
the nucleus accumbens can be subdivided into core 
and shell compartments. This anatomical parcella-
tion is in line with a previously suggested functional 
division of the basal ganglia into limbic (accumbal), 
associative (dorsomedial striatal) and sensorimotor 
(dorsolateral striatal) loops (Joel and Weiner, 1994; 
Parent and Hazrati, 1993). Dopaminergic projec-
tions from the ventral tegmental area (VTA; so-
called “mesolimbic dopamine”) target the ventral 
striatum (including the nucleus accumbens) while 
“nigrostriatal” dopamine arising from the substan-
tia nigra pars compacta (SNc) targets the dorsal 
striatum (Amalric and Koob, 1993).
The ventral striatum, at the heart of the   limbic 
corticostriatal loop, is well positioned to support 
learning of predictive values (as in the Critic). 
Afferents from so-called “limbic” areas, the baso-
lateral amygdala and hippocampus, as well as from 
prefrontal cortical areas (Voorn et  al., 2004), can 
convey information about the current context and 
stimuli, and their affective values. Efferents from 
the ventral striatum, in turn, target dopaminergic 
neurons, thus state values can be incorporated into 
the prediction error signal. Importantly, the ventral 
striatum inﬂ  uences activity in both dopaminergic 
nuclei, that is, it projects to those dopaminergic 
neurons that project back to the ventral striatum 
and to those that project to the more motor-related 
dorsal striatum (Haber et al., 1990, 2000; Joel and 
Weiner, 1999, 2000; Lynd-Balta and Haber, 1994; 90 | July  2008 | Volume  2 | Issue  1  www.frontiersin.org
Nauta et al., 1978). Due to this strategic positioning, 
the ventral striatum has been likened to a “limbic-
motor interface” (Mogenson et al., 1980). In terms 
of the suggested Actor/Critic mapping, the ventral 
striatum is in a prime position to inﬂ  uence predic-
tion error learning signals for both the Actor and the 
Critic, as is necessary in the model (see Figure 1).
In accord with these suggestive anatomical data, 
behavioral, pharmacological, and neural imaging 
results have implicated the ventral striatum in evalu-
ation and prediction, and the dorsolateral striatum in 
action selection and execution (e.g., O’Doherty et al., 
2004; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Robbins et al., 1989; 
Figure 1B). More speciﬁ  cally, the ventral striatum has 
been shown to be involved in reward anticipation, in 
attributing value to Pavlovian stimuli, and in medi-
ating the ability of the affective value of anticipated 
outcomes to affect instrumental   performance, as in 
paradigms such as Pavlovian-instrumental   transfer 
and conditioned reinforcement (Balleine, 2005; 
Cardinal et al., 2002; Everitt et al., 1991; O’Doherty 
et al.,  2003). A further division of labor between 
the nucleus accumbens core and shell, putatively 
involved in general value predictions (as in the Critic) 
and speciﬁ  c outcome values (as is necessary for cor-
rect goal-directed responding), respectively, is also in 
line with current data (Cardinal et al., 2002; Corbit 
et al., 2001; Hall et al., 2001). The dorsolateral stria-
tum, on the other hand, has been implicated in habit 
learning and in the control of habitual responding 
(Atallah et al., 2007; Bailey and Mair, 2006; Balleine, 
2005; Knowlton et  al., 1996; Racht-Delatour and 
El  Massioui, 2000; Yin et  al., 2004, 2006), and is 
also the major site of dopamine loss in idiopathic 
Parkinson’s disease, with its predominantly motor-
related symptoms (e.g., Kish et  al., 1988). Finally, 
recent results show that disconnecting the dopamin-
ergic inﬂ  uence of the accumbens core on the dor-
solateral striatum impairs the execution of habitual 
responding for a second order reinforcer predictive 
of cocaine (Belin and Everitt, 2008). This effect may 
be general and not limited to drug-seeking behavior, 
thus illustrating the importance of these spiraling 
projections from ventral to dorsal areas.
It has proven more difﬁ  cult to garner direct sup-
port for this hypothesized functional subdivision 
from electrophysiological studies, as these have 
uncovered a bewildering wealth of representations 
in the striatum – essentially every possible task-
related event can be shown to be represented by stri-
atal medium spiny neurons (e.g., Schultz et al., 2000; 
Tremblay et al., 1998). Still, prominent in these are 
representations of outcome anticipation in ventral 
striatal areas (Schultz et al., 1992; Tremblay et al., 
1998; Williams et al., 1993) and those of actions and 
of action “chunks” in the dorsal striatum (Kimura, 
1986, 1995; Jog et al., 1999; Schultz and Romo, 1988; 
Ueda and Kimura, 2003).
The effects of dopamine on striatal neurons 
are also multifaceted. Structurally, glutamater-
gic cortical afferents and midbrain dopaminergic 
inputs converge onto common dendrites of striatal 
medium spiny neurons. Functionally, and impor-
tant for the Actor/Critic model, dopamine has been 
shown to affect plasticity in cortico-striatal syn-
apses, predominantly through D1 receptors, form-
ing what has been termed a “three factor learning 
rule” in which the coincidence of presynaptic and 
postsynaptic activity causes LTP if a modulatory 
dopaminergic signal is also present, and LTD oth-
erwise (Calabresi et  al., 2000; Houk et  al., 1995; 
Wickens, 1990; Wickens and Kotter, 1995; Wickens 
et al., 1996). For instance, in the accumbens core, 
co-infusion of low doses of a D1 receptor antago-
nist and an NMDA blocker impaired acquisition 
of instrumental learning (lever pressing for food), 
Figure 2 | Anatomical organization of the rat striatum and its afferents. In the center is 
a transverse section of the rat forebrain showing the striatum. Converging excitatory afferents 
from the frontal cortex (upper left), midline and intralaminar thalamic nuclei (upper right), basal 
amygdaloid complex (lower left) and hippocampal formation (lower right) project topographically 
to dorsomedial-to-ventrolateral zones. Frontal cortical areas and their corresponding striatal pro-
jection zones are shown in the same colors. Thalamic, amygdaloid and cortical afferents nicely 
align on one functional–anatomical organization. Abbreviations: ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; 
IL, infralimbic cortex; PFC, prefrontal cortex; dPL and vPL, dorsal and ventral prelimbic cortices; 
CeM, CL, IMD, MD, PC and PV, central medial, central lateral, intermediodorsal, mediodorsal, para-
central and paraventricular thalamic nuclei, respectively (adapted from Voorn et al., 2004).
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even though these low doses were not sufﬁ  cient to 
induce an impairment when infused alone (Smith-
Roe and Kelley, 2000).
In sum, the evidence is consistent with a predic-
tion and action selection system in which   phasic 
dopamine signals a TD prediction error signal, 
which trains value predictions (as in the Critic) via 
projections from the VTA to ventral striatal and 
frontal target areas while simultaneously reinforc-
ing the current action-selection policy (as in the 
Actor) through SNc projections to the dorsolateral 
striatum. Indeed, within a broader scheme, one 
might view the basal-ganglia/dopamine system as 
a system of multiple Actors and Critics operating in 
parallel, which can collaborate or compete to con-
trol behavior (Daw et al., 2005). In this, the dorso-
lateral striatum may support an Actor that relies on 
action propensities that are learned incrementally 
through trial and error (as described above), sug-
gestive of inﬂ  exible stimulus-response habits that 
are independent of speciﬁ  c outcome predictions. 
By contrast, the dorsomedial striatum may support 
a second Actor that relies on computations of action 
values based on so-called response-outcome repre-
sentations, thereby allowing goal-directed action 
selection that is more ﬂ  exible and controlled by 
detailed outcome expectations (and not only scalar 
valued expectations in some common currency). 
Finally, Pavlovian responding may result from the 
operation of a third Actor or may be a direct con-
sequence of value predictions (Dayan et al., 2006), 
thus placing the Pavlovian “Actor” in value learning 
areas such as the ventral striatum and the amygdala 
(Balleine and Killcross, 2006).
Whether the value learning Critic system is also 
divisible into a scalar prediction Critic (as neces-
sary for the traditional Actor/Critic architecture), 
perhaps in the nucleus accumbens core and cen-
tral nucleus of the amygdala, and a second Critic 
supporting more speciﬁ  c predictions of outcomes 
(as in goal-directed behavior), perhaps in the 
accumbens shell, basolateral amygdala and/or orbit-
ofrontal cortex, is less clear2. Also unclear is the role 
of dopamine in training the non-habitual Actors, 
and indeed whether there are outcome-speciﬁ  c and 
  outcome-general prediction errors. In any case, for 
our current purposes the rather well-substantiated 
mapping of the dorsolateral striatum to a habit-
ual Actor, and the nucleus accumbens core to the 
scalar value learning Critic (that can also support 
  preparatory Pavlovian responses) sufﬁ  ces. This is 
because the data of Takahashi et al. (2007), to which 
we will now turn, were from these two areas.
If indeed the dorsolateral and ventral striatum 
and their corresponding dopaminergic signals func-
tion in such a highly integrated manner as suggested 
by the Actor/Critic architecture (for challenges to 
this view, see Dayan and Balleine, 2002), then small 
perturbations could be expected to have pronounced 
effects on learning and ultimately on normal, adap-
tive (habitual) responding. In the next section, we 
brieﬂ  y describe evidence from Takahashi et al. (2007) 
showing that exposure to an addictive drug causes 
massive changes in putative correlates of associative 
learning in this system. Thereafter we will consider 
these changes within an Actor/Critic architecture 
and use this model to suggest potential mechanisms 
whereby cocaine might be having its effects.
COCAINE SENSITIZATION: DIFFERENTIAL 
EFFECTS ON THE DORSAL/VENTRAL DIVIDE
To study the long-term effects of cocaine on sign-
aling of predicted value in the striatum, Takahashi 
et al. (2007) recorded single-unit activity in the ven-
tral and dorsolateral striatum of rats that had been 
sensitized to cocaine approximately 1–3 months 
earlier (Figure 3A). Recordings were made as these 
rats and saline-treated control animals learned and 
reversed a series of novel go, no-go odor discrimi-
nation problems (Figure 4A). In each problem, a 
pair of novel odor cues were paired with a sucrose 
reward and a quinine punishment (Schoenbaum 
et al., 1999b). Correct performance depended on 
acquiring associations between the odor cues and 
the rewarding and aversive outcomes, presumably 
resulting in the attribution of motivational value 
or signiﬁ  cance to the cues. In addition, the rats 
were required to associate each cue with a different 
response (go or no-go) in order to solve the dis-
crimination and each reversal (Figure 4A). Previous 
work has shown that rats sensitized to or trained 
to self-administer cocaine exhibit a long-lasting 
reversal learning impairment in this task (Calu 
et al., 2007; Schoenbaum et al., 2004). Consistent 
with this, cocaine-treated rats in the current study 
successfully reversed a much lower proportion of 
the odor problems to which they were exposed than 
the saline-treated controls.
In the context of this behavior, Takahashi et al. 
(2007) found that in control rats neurons in both 
ventral and dorsolateral striatum ﬁ   red to the 
cues based on their associations with subsequent 
responses and/or outcomes. This cue-selective activ-
ity developed with learning and reversed in both 
regions when the meaning of the cues was switched 
2The evidence most in favor of such a subdivision of the Critic 
is rather circumstantial, deriving from the existence of two 
distinct forms of Pavlovian behavior (Balleine and Killcross, 
2006; Dickinson and Balleine, 2002) – preparatory behavior that 
is motivationally speciﬁ  c but otherwise rather outcome-general 
(as in approach and withdrawal), and consummatory responses 
that are speciﬁ   c to the predicted stimulus (such as licking, 
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Figure 3 | Single-unit activity in ventral striatum in saline- and cocaine-treated rats during discrimination and reversal learning. (A) Experimental timeline 
showing the relative timing of behavioral training, cocaine sensitization and recording. (B,C) Average activity in populations of neurons recorded in ventral striatum 
(nucleus accumbens core) during acquisition and reversal of a series of odor discrimination problems (only successful reversals were included), during pre-criterion 
trials, post-criterion trials and post-reversal. Activity was normalized to the maximum ﬁ  ring of each neuron during odor sampling. The left column (B) shows activ-
ity in saline-treated control rats and the right column (C) shows activity in cocaine-treated rats. In each case, population responses are shown separately for all 
neurons (small insets) and for cue-selective neurons (large plots; cue-selective neurons were deﬁ  ned as any neuron with differential activity during odor sampling 
after learning at p < 0.05, ANOVA). In blue is activity on trials with odor 1 (which predicted sucrose before reversal), and in red is activity on trials with odor 2 (which 
predicted quinine before reversal). Gray shading in each histogram indicates the approximate timing of odor sampling. Bar graphs show averaged ﬁ  ring rates (spikes 
per second) for each odor in each phase in the cue-selective populations (*, signiﬁ  cant difference at p < 0.05; **, signiﬁ  cant difference at p < 0.01 or better, ANOVA). 
The neural population in saline-treated controls showed strong ﬁ  ring to the odor cue that predicted the aversive quinine outcome in pre-criterion trials, post-criterion 
trials, and after reversal. In contrast, the neural population in cocaine-treated rats was not cue-selective in either phase (adapted from Takahashi et al., 2007).
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Figure 4 | Single-unit activity in dorsolateral striatum in saline- and cocaine-treated rats during discrimination and reversal learning. (A) Timing of events 
within each trial. After reversal, the mapping between odor 1 and odor 2 and the sucrose and quinine outcomes was reversed. Odor identities were counterbalanced 
across rats. (B,C) Average activity in populations of neurons recorded in dorsolateral striatum during acquisition and reversal of a series of odor discrimination problems 
(conventions as in Figure 3). The neural population in cocaine-treated group exhibited stronger phasic ﬁ  ring to the odor cue that predicted the sucrose outcome than 
the population in saline-treated controls. This difference was especially evident during pre-criterion and post-criterion trials (adapted from Takahashi et al., 2007).94 | July  2008 | Volume  2 | Issue  1  www.frontiersin.org
(Figures 3B and 4B). However several key differ-
ences emerged between the two areas, consistent 
with their putative roles in the Actor/Critic models. 
Cue-selectivity in ventral striatum developed rap-
idly during learning, preceding the development of 
accurate responding, and ﬁ  ring was much higher to 
the odor cue that predicted the more motivationally-
signiﬁ  cant aversive quinine outcome (Figure 3B). 
In contrast, cue-selectivity in dorsolateral striatum 
developed later, only alongside accurate differential 
responding (Figure 4B). These differences ﬁ  t well 
with the proposal that ventral striatum learns the 
value of the cue, so that it is then able to coach the 
dorsolateral striatum regarding the proper action to 
execute in response to each odor cue.
Consistent with the proposal that addiction 
might involve changes in striatal function, prior 
cocaine-treatment had a signiﬁ  cant impact on the 
neural correlates in both striatal regions (Figures 3C 
and 4C, compare to Figures 3B and 4B). First, after 
learning, cocaine-treated rats had substantially 
fewer cue-selective neurons in ventral striatum 
than saline controls. The absence of such neurons 
in cocaine-treated rats was evident in the popula-
tion responses (Figure 3C), which did not exhibit 
cue-selectivity in any phase of training. By contrast, 
cocaine-treatment caused a small but signiﬁ  cant 
increase in the number of cue-responsive neurons 
in dorsolateral striatum, especially to the positive 
odor cue that drove most of the neural activity 
observed in controls. The effect is somewhat evident 
in the population responses in Figure 4C, where the 
relatively weak and slow to develop response to the 
positive odor cue seen in controls is more robust in 
the cocaine-treated rats. The stronger response to 
the positive odor in cocaine-treated rats was par-
ticularly evident in the pre-criterion trials, thus dif-
ferential activity appeared earlier in cocaine-treated 
rats in dorsolateral striatum.
These results show that cocaine sensitization 
shifted the balance of encoding between these two 
regions, abolishing the strong cue-selectivity nor-
mally present in ventral striatum while marginally 
enhancing the relatively weak cue-selectivity nor-
mally present in dorsolateral striatum. In the next 
section, we will consider how such an effect might 
be interpreted within the Actor/Critic model of 
striatal function.
A COACH GONE AWRY AND AN ACTOR 
RUNNING LOOSE
According to the above mapping between an Actor/
Critic architecture and the subparts of the stria-
tum, one consequence of radically reduced cue 
selectivity in the ventral striatum may be the severe 
degradation (or even elimination) of the   feedback 
from the Critic to the Actor. In other words, if 
cue-evoked activity in ventral striatum is in fact 
signaling information about state values, as pro-
posed for the Critic, then Takahashi et al.’s (2007) 
results show that cocaine sensitization disrupts this 
function. Within an Actor/Critic model, this would 
have profound effects on the ability of the Actor to 
learn to select the appropriate actions. In the fol-
lowing, we discuss two different ways that such a 
disturbance might be manifest, and their implica-
tions for action selection. In the Discussion we fur-
ther develop ideas for future experiments targeted 
at testing these two alternatives more directly.
How can we envision an Actor/Critic network 
without a functioning Critic? The simplest possi-
bility, depicted in Figure 5A, is that the Critic fails 
to learn or to represent state values properly, that is, 
the V(St) signals that it produces are meaningless. 
These would then be integrated into the prediction 
error that trains the Actor, and would lead to a per-
turbed learning process. This scenario is generally 
consistent with the results of Takahashi et al. (2007) 
in that cue-evoked activity in the ventral stria-
tum of cocaine-sensitize rats did not distinguish 
between the two cues. We can thus model this as 
a situation in which all V(St) are the same, regard-
less of the state St. In this case, the prediction error 
δt = r(St) + V(St) − V(St−1) reduces to δt = r(St), i.e., 
the prediction error is equal to the immediately 
available reward only.
Although it is obviously naïve to envision 
cocaine sensitization as completely wiping out 
any representation of V(St), we think it is useful 
to consider such an extreme situation in order to 
understand the potential consequences of a deﬁ  cit 
in the Critic’s representations. Speciﬁ  cally, we’d like 
to ask what are the consequences of this hypoth-
esized deﬁ  cient training signal for the Actor, i.e., 
for representations in the dorsolateral striatum and 
for overt behavior? On the one hand, in tasks with 
outcomes that depend on a series of actions, that 
is, those scenarios in which the credit assignment 
problem is severe and an intact Actor/Critic archi-
tecture is necessary for proper learning, a learning 
signal that is based at every time-point only on 
immediate reward will not be sufﬁ  cient to learn the 
task. This predicts that cocaine sensitization would 
have a large detrimental effect on subsequent habit-
ual learning and action selection in such tasks. On 
the other hand, in those (simpler to learn) tasks 
in which actions are immediately rewarded in an 
unambiguous way, learning may actually be faster. 
That is because it will not be hindered by incorrect 
estimations of future values which are common 
early on in the learning process.
Odor discrimination learning is of the latter 
kind – odors predict the immediate outcome (sucrose 
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Figure 5 | Two possible realizations of an Actor/Critic network with a dysfunctional Critic. (A) The Critic is unable to learn 
or represent a meaningful mapping between states and their values (depicted is the extreme case of similar values for all states), 
thus the prediction error signal δ that is used to train the Actor comprises only of the current reward. (B) A deﬁ  cient prediction error 
signal disrupts learning in both the Critic and the Actor (depicted is the extreme case of no prediction error whatsoever).
or quinine) to a go or a no-go response. In this sense, 
it is perhaps not surprising that performance was 
not disrupted after cocaine sensitization, and that 
representations in the dorsolateral striatum were 
intact, or even slightly enhanced. Indeed in a prior 
study in which initial learning was carefully exam-
ined, cocaine-treated rats showed a small but nearly 
signiﬁ  cant improvement in acquisition of the initial 
discrimination problem learned (Schoenbaum et al., 
2004), and we have observed a similar facilitation in 
accumbens-lesioned rats (Schoenbaum and Setlow, 
2003). While such facilitations are difﬁ  cult to observe 
in recording work, where rats have developed a “learn-
ing set” for these problems, these prior observations 
are consistent with the idea that removal of the part 
of the Critic that is located in ventral striatum may 
actually enhance learning of simple discriminations.
Furthermore, that cocaine-sensitized rats 
reversed fewer of the discriminations successfully 
may, in fact, hint at stronger learning of the initial 
discrimination, which then impeded later reversal 
of the behavioral policy. Indeed, learning with a per-
sistent reward signal (i.e., one that does not come to 
be “predicted away” by predictive cues) could lead 
to stronger habitual learning, to the point of maxi-
mal action propensities. This idea would be con-
sistent with other evidence showing that reversal 
deﬁ  cits after cocaine are associated with inﬂ  exible 
encoding in the basolateral amygdala (Stalnaker 
et al., 2007).
A second option, depicted in Figure 5B, is that 
cocaine sensitization affects the prediction error 
signal itself. An invalid error signal (or, considering 
once again the extreme case – no prediction error 
signal) would disrupt learning in both the Critic 
and the Actor and thus would account for the loss 
of cue-selectivity in the ventral striatum. However, 
this idea is not in line with the ﬁ  nding that both 
behavior and the representations in the dorsolateral 
striatum were intact, unless there is some other 
means by which action propensities and dorsola-
teral striatal representation can be learned, at least 
in cases in which rewards are immediate. This lat-
ter suggestion is not entirely speculative – as men-
tioned, recent work has highlighted the existence of 
multiple learning and action selection systems in 
the brain, presumably all working in parallel and 
interacting (whether in competition or in synergy) 
to control behavior (Balleine 2005; Daw et al., 2005; 
Johnson et  al., 2007). Pavlovian “approach” and 
“withdrawal” responses, perhaps acquired through 
prediction learning in the central and basolateral 
nuclei of the amygdala, and/or in the nucleus 
accumbens shell (from which Takahashi et al., 2007 
did not record), could sufﬁ  ce to generate the correct 
behavioral response (Dayan et al., 2006), and could 
perhaps provide surrogate training signals for the 
Actor. Such alternative training could conceivably 
result in representations that are more resistant to 
reversal, due to the absence of a ﬂ  exibly adapting 
dopaminergic training signal.
Of the two options we suggest, it is not imme-
diately clear which is more in line with the effects 
of cocaine sensitization. This is partly due to the 
requirements of the task used by Takahashi et al. 
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immediate outcomes in each trial. This task was 
chosen because rats can readily learn it (and per-
form reversals), which allows for clear assessment 
of behavioral and neural implications of different 
treatments on the learning process itself. Indeed, 
this task has been widely used to record in other 
areas, and robust behavioral and neural effects 
have been shown with previous pharmacological 
or lesion manipulations (Gallagher et  al., 1999; 
Saddoris et  al., 2005; Schoenbaum et  al., 1998, 
1999a, 2003; Setlow et  al., 2003; Stalnaker et  al., 
2006, 2007). However, that this task is learned with 
such ease is perhaps because of its simple structure: 
only one action is required to obtain (or avoid) an 
outcome (see Figure 4A), rather than a series of 
actions. Moreover, this action is not opposed to 
the Pavlovian tendency to approach predictors of 
reward and avoid predictors of punishment. This 
is likely also the reason that cocaine-sensitized rats 
with severely disrupted ventral striatal representa-
tions were still able to learn new discriminations 
and reversals, and basically display intact behavior 
in this task. Indeed, it seems that in tasks that pro-
vide a more difﬁ  cult test-bed for the Actor/Critic 
mechanism, both deﬁ  cits should show more severe 
implications for learning and action selection, 
much beyond those seen in Takahashi et al.’s (2007) 
results.
DISCUSSION
Takahashi et al.’s (2007) study showed that cocaine 
sensitization disrupts encoding in the ventral stria-
tum, while leaving dorsolateral striatal encoding 
and behavior mostly intact. Based on the idea that 
the dorsolateral and ventral striatum may function 
as an Actor and a Critic, respectively, we have sug-
gested two ways in which these results can be inter-
preted within an Actor/Critic framework. Although 
this is certainly not the only framework within which 
to consider these data, the Actor/Critic framework 
has strong empirical support and also makes very 
speciﬁ  c predictions about the underlying mecha-
nism. In particular, the two ways that we suggest 
these changes might arise differ in whether the pri-
mary (and thus treatable) cause lies within ventral 
striatum itself or is in the incoming dopaminergic 
projections.
Several straightforward directions of future 
research thus come to mind – extensions which 
would allow us to tease apart the two possible dis-
ruptions. First, if ventral striatal representations 
are indeed used to generate a training signal for 
the dorsolateral striatum which takes into account 
delayed as well as immediate rewards, a task in 
which outcomes are dependent on a sequence of 
actions should show grossly disrupted learning and 
performance after cocaine sensitization. At the very 
least, even if behavioral impairments are masked by 
other (intact) action selection systems in the brain, 
we expect to see disrupted representations in the 
dorsolateral striatum in this case. Second, record-
ings from dopaminergic neurons should reveal an 
altered prediction error signal after cocaine sen-
sitization: the signal should either be dominated 
by immediate rewards (according to the option 
in Figure 5A) or be altogether uninformative or 
absent (as in Figure 5B). Third, if the prediction 
error signal is indeed wholly disrupted as in the 
second option above, a task in which Pavlovian 
conditioning is not sufﬁ  cient to produce the cor-
rect behavior could reveal additional behavioral 
deﬁ  cits. Finally, in this case (as well as in general), it 
would be extremely interesting to test the implica-
tions of cocaine sensitization on representations in 
the shell of the nucleus accumbens and the dorso-
medial striatum.
As we have already noted, cocaine-induced 
impairments in reversal tasks or in tasks that model 
aspects of reversal learning appear to reﬂ  ect not an 
absence of learning but rather abnormally strong 
initial learning. That is, addicts and animals exposed 
to cocaine show normal responding before reversal 
but then fail to change behavior after reversal. In 
the present study, these reversal deﬁ  cits seemed to 
be linked to enhanced signaling in the dorsolateral 
striatum. However, we have previously demon-
strated that they are also associated with persistent 
miscoding of the original associations in the baso-
lateral amygdala (Stalnaker et al., 2007). Moreover, 
removal of the basolateral amygdala is sufﬁ  cient 
to restore normal performance (Stalnaker et  al., 
2007), suggesting that this aberrant encoding is the 
proximal cause of the cocaine-dependent reversal 
deﬁ  cit. These results are also consistent with the 
observation that cue-evoked relapse is ameliorated 
by infusions of agents into the amygdala that dis-
rupt memory reconsolidation during exposure to 
drug cues (Lee et al., 2005).
Thus, drug exposure does not seem to prevent 
learning in general, as would be expected if error 
signals were eliminated. Instead, it seems to make 
learning more difﬁ  cult when delayed or probabilis-
tic outcomes must be tallied. For instance, addicts 
and drug-treated animals show increased sensitiv-
ity to delay of reward, behaving more “impulsively”, 
and also show increased sensitivity to reward mag-
nitude (Coffey et  al., 2003; Roesch et  al., 2007; 
Simon et al., 2007). This pattern of results suggests 
interference with the Critic, but supports the idea 
that at least some part of the prediction error sig-
nal is intact, and continues to support learning. In 
fact, reliance on a prediction error that is domi-
nated by immediate rewards would indeed result 
in increased impulsivity and sensitivity to reward 
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magnitude. However, these are also consistent with 
increasing reliance on a Pavlovian learning system, 
which could be an obvious consequence of any type 
of disruption of the instrumental action-selection 
mechanism.
Interestingly, although it is not well-mod-
eled with current theories of instrumental choice, 
cocaine also appears to cause signiﬁ  cant changes 
in how information about expected outcomes is 
  signaled by frontal areas. We have previously dem-
onstrated that cocaine-treated rats are unable to use 
information about outcomes to guide behavior in a 
Pavlovian setting (Schoenbaum and Setlow, 2005), 
and Killcross and colleague have shown analogous 
effects of amphetamine on   outcome-guided behav-
ior in an instrumental setting (Nelson and Killcross, 
2006). Similar deﬁ  cits in the control of Pavlovian 
and instrumental behavior are caused by damage 
to the orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal areas 
respectively (Corbit and Balleine, 2003; Gallagher 
et al., 1999; Killcross and Coutureau, 2003), and are 
thought to reﬂ  ect the role of these areas in signaling 
information about expected outcomes, potentially 
to both instrumental and Pavlovian systems. Thus 
drug exposure may also disrupt outcome signaling 
by these critical prefrontal areas. In accord with this 
hypothesis, we have found that orbitofrontal neu-
rons in cocaine-treated rats fail to signal expected 
outcomes during cue-sampling (Stalnaker et  al., 
2006).
This proliferation of drug-induced deﬁ  cits sug-
gests yet a third possible explanation to the results 
we have described above: the loss of differential 
encoding of cues in the ventral striatum could 
be the result of disrupted representations carried 
by its cortical afferents. Thus, a common cause 
might be at the heart of the orbitofrontal, amy-
gdalar, and ventral striatal deﬁ  cits, or one of these 
may be inﬂ  uencing the others, to their detriment. 
However, the preservation or even enhancement 
of the dorsolateral striatal representations argues 
against this idea, especially if the core of the deﬁ  cit 
were in higher cortices that presumably modulate 
not only the limbic corticostriatal loop, but also 
the associative and motor loops (Joel and Weiner, 
1999). That the dorsolateral striatal representations 
remained intact thus suggests that the problem may 
not be as severe as an insidious lack of representa-
tion in the prefrontal cortex. Still, the relationships 
and interactions between the different drug-
induced deﬁ  cits remain as an intriguing question 
for future research.
In sum, the pervasive and detrimental effects of 
(even mild forms of) drug abuse are astounding. 
We have suggested here that combining experimen-
tal ﬁ  ndings with a computational analysis can allow 
not only for a system-level interpretation of elec-
trophysiological results and their relationship to 
behavioral deﬁ  cits, but can also suggest a wealth of 
new experiments. Indeed, it sometimes seems that 
the questions outnumber the answers. By bringing 
theoretical models to bear on concrete ﬁ  ndings, we 
can only hope to make another small step in the 
direction of understanding (and ultimately curing) 
drug addiction.
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